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IMG-041        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 09-2557 
 ___________ 
 
 ABDALLAH ISSAKH, 
        Petitioner 
 
 v. 
 
 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES 
 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
 Board of Immigration Appeals 
 (Agency No. A096-169-731) 
 Immigration Judge:  Honorable Mirlande Tadal 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
February 16, 2011 
 Before:  AMBRO, GREENAWAY, JR. AND GREENBERG, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed May 10, 2011  ) 
 ___________ 
 
 OPINION 
 ___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
Petitioner Abdallah Issakh, a native and citizen of Chad, petitions for review of a 
final order of removal from the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), dismissing his 
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appeal from the denial of his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and 
protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).  For the reasons that follow, 
we will grant the petition for review, vacate the final order of removal, and remand to the 
BIA for further proceedings.  
I. 
Issakh first entered the United States on July 23, 2002, on a business visa.  On 
February 10, 2003, he filed an application for asylum claiming that the Chadian 
government persecuted him on the basis of his race and membership in a particular social 
group, the Guran tribe.  That application was denied.
1
  Issakh returned to Chad in 2007.  
He re-entered the United States on July 10, 2008, and was immediately placed in removal 
proceedings.  Issakh conceded removability and applied for asylum, withholding of 
removal, and protection under CAT on the basis that while in Chad he was persecuted on 
account of an imputed political opinion or his ethnicity.    
At his merits hearing, Issakh testified that he had returned to Chad in 2007 
because he had lost his authorization to work in the United States, and he had received 
news that his family was in shambles and his home village had been destroyed as a result 
of continuing civil strife in the country.  He returned to Chad via Sudan, which he entered 
                                                 
1
 Issakh‟s appeal to the BIA was dismissed on March 10, 2005.  He subsequently 
filed a motion to reconsider that was denied on June 27, 2005.  The BIA denied his 
motion to reopen on November 18, 2005.  The United States Court of Appeals for 
the Seventh Circuit denied his petition for review challenging the denial of his 
motion to reopen on January 11, 2007.  See Issakh v. Gonzales, No. 05-4636, 2007 
 3 
 
with a fraudulent Sudanese passport.  After spending approximately three weeks in a 
border refugee camp in Sudan, Issakh crossed into Chad to exchange his United States 
currency.  While in the exchange shop, he was approached by a government security 
officer who asked Issakh for his identity card.  Issakh told the officer that he had come 
from Libya.  Issakh testified that the agent became suspicious of his lack of official 
documents and made a phone call.  Within minutes, additional officers arrived and 
arrested Issakh.  They detained him in a local jail, beat him, and demanded to know who 
he was and who he was related to.  AR 168.  Issakh gave them the address of a man that 
he had stayed with at the refugee camp, Mohamed, and Mohamed was found and brought 
in the next morning.  Issakh testified that Mohamed told them everything he knew about 
Issakh‟s situation, including that he had just returned from the United States.  AR 169.  
The next day, Issakh was transported to another jail that was several hours away by car.  
He was detained there for ninety days, during which time he was accused of being a rebel 
against the governing regime, and was severely beaten.  Issakh testified that the guards 
told him they knew he was a rebel because of the fact that he had money, and because he 
lied about his identity.  The officers accused his whole family of being rebels and 
demanded that he give them the name of a relative in Chad.  AR 170.   
Issakh maintained his story that he was from Libya, but disclosed the name of an 
acquaintance with whom he had commercial transactions in the 1990s.  AR 171.  The 
                                                                                                                                                             
U.S. App. LEXIS 1025, at *13 (7th Cir. Jan. 11, 2007).   
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police found the man and brought him to the prison.  The man confirmed that Issakh was 
a business acquaintance whom he had known for a long time.  After this, Issakh testified, 
his situation grew much worse.  AR 172.  He was taken from his cell to a room and 
interrogated by an alleged “attorney” who asked him again if he was a rebel and exhorted 
him to “tell the truth.”  AR 173.  When Issakh maintained his story about being from 
Libya, he was struck on the back with a rifle butt, causing him to hit his head on the table.  
He was also tied up by the hands and feet, hung upside down from the ceiling, and beaten 
severely.  The officers hit him with fists and boots, lashed him with a whip, and 
threatened that they would kill him unless he told the truth.  AR 174.  When Issakh 
became totally exhausted from the beating, they put him back in his cell.  This was 
repeated again the next day, and the officers struck Issakh on the bottoms of his feet until 
his feet were swollen and raw.  AR 174.  Issakh testified that he was completely 
incapacitated after this beating, and could not walk or even stand.  AR 175.  He was only 
released when a rebel force took over the city and freed all prisoners in or around 
February 2008.  AR 176.  Issakh remained in Chad for the next five months, moving 
from house to house to avoid detection.  AR 176-77.  He was able to obtain a government 
issued national identity card.  He then purchased a fraudulent passport to leave Chad and 
returned to the United States.         
At the merits hearing, the IJ considered Issakh‟s testimony, as well as the State 
Department Reports relevant to Chad.  The IJ did not make an adverse credibility finding 
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against Issakh and acknowledged that his testimony appeared to be plausible in light of 
the background material detailing Chad‟s ongoing problems with civil strife and rebel 
groups, and its poor human rights record.  AR 111.  However, the IJ ultimately concluded 
that Issakh failed to meet his burden of demonstrating eligibility for asylum.  With 
respect to the arrest and detention, the IJ found that Issakh was targeted as a consequence 
of his intentional misrepresentation of his identity, and not on account of a protected 
ground.  In support of the conclusion that the authorities did not appear interested in 
harming Issakh on account of his ethnicity or actual or imputed political opinion, the IJ 
cited the fact that Issakh remained in Chad for five months following his detention 
unharmed, and was issued a national identification card with his true identity by a 
government office.  The IJ further held that this was not a mixed motive case.  In 
addition, the IJ faulted Issakh for failing to submit any medical documentation to 
evidence that he was mistreated as he claimed.   
The BIA dismissed Issakh‟s appeal for the reasons stated by the IJ.  In doing so, 
the BIA noted that the IJ did not find that Issakh was not credible, rather than he had 
failed to satisfy his burden of proof.  The BIA also noted Issakh‟s lack of corroborative 
evidence, and the fact that Issakh failed to seek medical attention in either Chad or in the 
United States.
 2
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 The BIA also determined that the IJ had not erred in refusing to allow Issakh to 
present evidence about the persecution he suffered prior to 2006 that formed the 
basis of his first asylum application.  Issakh has not raised that issue in this appeal.     
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The instant petition for review followed.   
II. 
We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1) to review final orders of 
removal issued by the BIA.  Hashmi v. Att‟y Gen., 531 F.3d 256, 259 (3d Cir. 2008).  
Where, as here, the Board adopts and affirms the decision of the IJ, as well as provides its 
own reasoning for its decision, “[we] review[] both the decisions of the IJ and the BIA.” 
Id.  We review the BIA‟s legal conclusions de novo, subject to established principles of 
deference.  See Kaplun v. Att‟y Gen., 602 F.3d 260, 265 (3d Cir. 2010).  “We review an 
IJ‟s factual findings, including his or her determination of whether an alien was subject to 
persecution or has a well-founded fear of future persecution, under the substantial 
evidence standard.”  Toure v. Att‟y Gen., 443 F.3d 310, 316 (3d Cir. 2006); see also 
Wong v. Att‟y Gen., 539 F.3d 225, 230 (3d Cir. 2008).  Although substantial evidence 
review is deferential, such that we may reverse only if a reasonable adjudicator would be 
compelled to conclude to the contrary, see 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B), that deference is 
conditioned on support in the record.  An IJ must support her factual determinations with 
“specific, cogent” reasons such that her conclusions “flow in a reasoned way from the 
evidence of record and are [not] arbitrary and conjectural in nature.”  Toure, 443 F.3d at 
316 (quoting Dia v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 228, 250 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc)).  Deference is 
not due where findings and conclusions are based on inferences or presumptions that are 
not supported by “reasonable, substantial and probative evidence on the record 
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considered as a whole.”  Mulanga v. Ashcroft, 349 F.3d 123, 131 (3d Cir. 20003); see 
also Abdille v. Ashcroft, 242 F.3d 477, 483-84 (3d Cir. 2001).   
III. 
In order to be eligible for asylum, Issakh must demonstrate that he is unable or 
unwilling to return to Chad “because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution 
on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or 
political opinion.”  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A); 8 U.S.C. § 1158.  Although not entirely 
clear from the IJ‟s oral opinion and the BIA‟s order, we read these decisions as finding 
that Issakh failed to demonstrate past persecution.  AR 3, 114.  To the extent they made 
such findings, we are compelled to reverse.  We have defined persecution as “extreme 
conduct” that includes “threats to life, confinement, torture, and economic restrictions so 
severe that they constitute a threat to life or freedom.”  Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1240 
& n.10 (3d Cir. 1993).  In determining whether harm rises to the level of persecution, the 
harm must be more than “mere harassment.”  See Ivanishvili v. U.S. Dep‟t of Justice, 433 
F.3d 332, 341 (2d Cir. 2006).  However, persecution need not rise to the level of torture 
to be a ground for asylum.  Kibinda v. Att‟y Gen., 477 F.3d 113, 119 (3d Cir. 2007).  
Issakh was held for ninety days—a substantial period of time—and there is no 
indication that he would have been released at all if it had not been for the rebel takeover 
of the prison.  Over that time, he was beaten on multiple occasions, once to the point 
where he could no longer stand and could only crawl.  He was also bound and strung 
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upside down, flogged with a whip, and his life was threatened.  He bears permanent scars 
from the ordeal.  This treatment far exceeds mere harassment and is sufficiently severe to 
rise to the level of persecution.  See Toure, 443 F.3d at 318-19; see also Baba v. Holder, 
569 F.3d 79, 85 (2d Cir. 2009) (finding persecution where individual was imprisoned for 
three days, then a week, beaten daily and threatened with death if he did not cease his 
political activity).   
Moreover, we believe the IJ‟s findings and conclusions regarding corroboration 
are not supported by substantial evidence in the record.  We note at the outset that the IJ 
did not make a credibility finding in this case, meaning that Issakh‟s testimony is entitled 
to a “rebuttable presumption of credibility on appeal.”  8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); 
Camara v. Att‟y Gen., 580 F.3d 196, 201 (3d Cir. 2009).  An alien‟s testimony by itself, 
if credible, can satisfy the burden of establishing a claim for relief by objective evidence.  
See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(a); Kibinda, F.3d 113 at 120 n.5.  Because Issakh does bear the 
burden of proof, however, he is required to submit corroborating evidence “when it is 
reasonable to expect corroborating evidence and there is no satisfactory explanation for 
its absence.”  Sandie v. Att‟y Gen., 562 F.3d 246, 252 (3d. Cir. 2009).  “„[N]o court shall 
reverse a determination made by a trier of fact with respect to availability of 
corroborating evidence . . . unless the court finds . . . that a reasonable trier of fact is 
compelled to conclude that such corroborating evidence is unavailable.‟”  Id. (quoting 8 
U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)).  As the IJ noted, however, unreasonable demands are not placed on 
 9 
 
an asylum applicant to present evidence to corroborate particular experiences.  See In re 
S-M-J, 21 I. & N. Dec. 722, 725 (BIA 1997).   
In this case Issakh testified that his beatings rendered him temporarily unable to 
stand or walk, that his feet were swollen and some of the skin was stripped, and that he 
still had a scar on his head and lash marks on his body.  Additionally, he submitted a 
letter from the acquaintance who identified him, stating that “I noticed signs of torture on 
him and he appeared to be very week [sic].”  AR 267.  Issakh‟s attempts to display the  
scarring on his feet to the IJ during his merits hearing were harshly rebuffed.  AR 175.  
Thus, given that the IJ did not find that Issakh was not credible, the IJ must have rested 
her conclusion that Issakh failed to provide persuasive evidence of his mistreatment on 
the fact that Issakh did not seek medical attention.  But that is inconsistent with our 
decision in Issiaka v. Attorney General, where we rejected an IJ‟s adverse credibility 
finding that was in part based on the respondent‟s failure to testify that he had received 
medical care.  569 F.3d 135, 140-41 (3d Cir. 2009) (stating that “even „if best practices‟ 
would require that Issiaka receive stitches, there is nothing here to suggest that he had 
access to that kind of medical care.  He was, after all, in rural West Africa, and it appears 
that the IJ never even considered that circumstance or context before drawing a negative 
inference from Issiaka‟s failure to say that he received stitches.”).  As in Issiaka, the IJ 
and BIA do not appear to have considered Issakh‟s particular circumstances or context 
before drawing a negative inference from his failure to seek medical attention.  Issakh 
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testified that he was essentially living on the lam for the few months following his release 
until he could secure safe passage to the United Sates, and the State Department Country 
Report for Chad paints a picture of a country disrupted by civil strife, where it appears 
unlikely that medical intervention is readily available.  Indeed there was no evidence 
submitted that Issakh was privy to medical care that he did not avail himself of.  Nor was 
there any evidence submitted that would tend to suggest that Issakh was not mistreated in 
prison as he attests.  Accordingly, this is a situation in which a reasonable trier of fact 
would conclude that corroborating medical documentation is unavailable.    
We next consider Issakh‟s claim that the IJ incorrectly determined that the record 
did not establish that he was persecuted on account of a protected ground, specifically, 
because of his political opinion or an opinion imputed to him based on his membership in 
the Guran tribe.  A “key task for any asylum applicant is to show a sufficient „nexus‟ 
between persecution and one of the listed protected grounds.”  Ndayshimiye v. Att‟y 
Gen., 557 F.3d 124, 129 (3d Cir. 2009).  An asylum applicant, however, need not 
demonstrate that the protected ground was the exclusive motivation behind the alleged 
persecution.  He may prevail if he can provide some evidence that a protected 
characteristic was or will be at least “one central reason” for the alleged persecution.  Id.; 
see also INA § 208(b)(1)(B)(i); 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i).  A persecutor‟s motives may 
be mixed if part of the motivation is covered under the statute.  See Chang v. INS, 119 
F.3d 1055, 1065 (3d Cir. 1997).  The statute does not require that the motive alleging a 
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protected basis occupy a higher rank than any other unprotected motive.  Ndayshimiye, 
557 F.3d at 130.  However, “asylum may not be granted if a protected ground is only an 
incidental, tangential, or superficial reason for persecution of an asylum applicant.”  Id.  
In this case, the IJ found that Issakh was persecuted solely because he made 
misrepresentations to the authorities, and summarily rejected the claim that this was a 
mixed-motive case.
 3
  We find that conclusion to be unsupported by the record.  Although 
the record does support the IJ‟s finding that Issakh was initially detained because he 
lacked identity documents, there is substantial evidence that over the course of his 
detention, the officials learned information about Issakh‟s identity that gave them reason 
to believe he was a ethnic Guran and/or a rebel, or to impute that status or political 
opinion to him.  The record reflects both that the police repeatedly accused Issakh of 
being a rebel, and that Issakh‟s treatment at the hands of the police significantly 
worsened once they verified his true identity.  Specifically, it was only after Issakh‟s 
former acquaintance told the police that he “had known [Issakh] for a long period of time 
and that was a long, long, time ago,” AR 172, that Issakh received his most severe 
beatings.  This testimony is inconsistent with the IJ‟s conclusion that, once the authorities 
were aware of Issakh‟s identity, they did not appear interested in harming him on account 
of his ethnicity or actual or imputed political opinion.  AR 16, 78.   
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 We also note that although the IJ‟s finding that there was no mixed motive was 
challenged by Issakh on direct appeal, the BIA failed to address that argument in 
its opinion.     
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In addition, the IJ failed to consider Issakh‟s testimony that two different 
individuals disclosed information to the authorities regarding Issakh‟s true identity.  
Indeed, the IJ appeared to misunderstand Issakh‟s testimony on this issue.  The IJ recalled 
that Issakh stated that the officials insisted that he “disclose the truth and that the 
respondent was a rebel from Libya,”  AR 67, when in fact Issakh‟s testimony is clear that 
the officers continued to harass him because they either knew or suspected that he was 
not Libyan at all.  AR 168, 170-173.  The fact that Issakh was able to obtain an identity 
card and remain unharmed in Chad for five months while in hiding is not substantial 
evidence that Issakh‟s ordeal was not motivated, at least in part, on account of a protected 
ground.  Although it may have been reasonable to conclude from the record that Issakh‟s 
initial detention stemmed from his lack of identity documents, the IJ did not meaningfully 
consider Issakh‟s argument that, after verifying Issakh‟s identity, the officers were 
operating with mixed motives.  Given the evidence in the record and the lack of analysis 
of this claim, we are compelled to vacate the IJ‟s summary conclusion that there was no 
mixed motive in this case.
4
 
IV. 
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 We do not address Issakh‟s claim under the CAT because he did not 
administratively exhaust this claim on appeal to the BIA, nor does he raise it in his 
petition for review.   
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Accordingly, we will grant the petition for review.  The final order of removal will 
be vacated and this matter will be remanded to the BIA for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion.  
